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OPSOMMING 
Die filosofie van die beskerming van aandeelhouers in die Maatskappywet  
71 van 2008 
Die regte en remedies van aandeelhouers ingevolge die Maatskappywet 71 van 2008 word 
in hierdie artikel bespreek. Die doel is nie om die besonderhede van die remedies te be-
spreek nie, maar om ŉ hoëvlak evaluasie van die beskerming van aandeelhouers inge-
volge die wetgewing te doen. So ŉ evaluasie is wenslik en noodsaaklik om te bepaal of 
die filosofie soos beoog in die Maatskappywet van 2008 inderdaad geïmplementeer is 
deur spesifieke bepalings en om te bepaal hoe hierdie filosofie verskil van dié in die 
Maatskappywet 61 van 1973, asook hoe dit die gemeenregtelike reëls in hierdie verband 
wysig. Daar word aandag gegee aan die bestuur van maatskappye deur die verhouding 
tussen die direksie en aandeelhouers te ondersoek en te kyk na die direksiestruktuur en die 
aanstelling en afdanking van direkteure. Verder word gekyk na die regte van belange-
houers (“stakeholders”), remedies tot hulle beskikking en die regte van aandeelhouers ten 
opsigte van die vergoeding van direkteure. Daar word laastens ondersoek tot watter mate 
aandeelhouers bemagtig is om aktiewe aandeelhouers (in die bestuur van die maatskappy) 
te wees. Dit word gedoen aan die hand van die struktuur van eienaarskap van die tipies 
Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappy. Die agtergrond van die artikel is dus die verklaarde missie 
van die Maatskappywet dat dit aandeelhouersregte moet beskerm, aandeelhoueraktivisme 
moet bevorder en voorsiening moet maak vir beter beskerming van minderheidsaandeel-
houers. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
South Africa follows a hybrid system of corporate governance. It is partly legis-
lated and partly voluntary.1 Directors’ duties and the principles of good govern-
________________________ 
 1 See in general Esser and Havenga (eds) Corporate Governance Annual Review (2012); 
Naidoo Corporate governance. An essential guide for South African companies (2010) and 
in general on corporate governance Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum Oil and Gas Corpora-
tion of South Africa (SOC) Limited [2015] JOL 33744 (WCC) and cases cited there. 
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ance are therefore not only regulated in terms of legislation2 and the common 
law. Important recommendations are also contained in codes of best practice 
such as the King report on governance, 2009 with its Code of corporate govern-
ance.3  
“Corporate governance” has become an international term with various at-
tempts being made to provide concise definitions.4 For purposes of our discus-
sion the following definition of corporate governance is the most apposite: “Cor-
porate governance is a balance in which shareholders limit their right to manage 
the company in exchange for limited liability and the greater efficiency of cen-
tralised management.”5 This balance is allocated in various ways in different ju-
risdictions.6 In this article we consider this “balance” by examining the protec-
tion that shareholders receive and whether it is sufficient, especially in view of 
the general philosophy of the Act.  
The Department of Trade and Industry published a policy paper which envis-
aged the development of a “clear, facilitating, predictable and consistently en-
forced law” to provide “a protective and fertile environment for economic activi-
ty”.7 The vision stated by the Policy document was “that company law should 
promote the competitiveness and development of the South African economy” 
by 
“1. Encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise development, and consequently, 
employment opportunities by— 
(a) simplifying the procedures for forming companies; and 
________________________ 
 2 In the context of corporate law the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter 2008 Companies 
Act) is the relevant Act (unless stated otherwise, all references below are to this Act). The 
Act came into operation on 1 May 2011. In February 2007 a draft Companies Bill was 
published. During September 2008 Parliament’s Trade and Industry Portfolio Committee 
approved the Companies Bill of 2008. In December 2008 the Portfolio Committee 
amended the Bill. The 2008 Companies Act was assented to on 8 April 2009. Draft 
Regulations to the Companies Act were published for comment on 22 December 2009 and 
again on 29 November 2010. See N 1664, GG 32832 of 22 December 2009 and GG 33695 
of 27 October 2010 for the Regulations and the Amendment Bill. The Companies 
Amendment Bill B40-2010 was approved by the Portfolio Committee on Trade and 
Industry on 10 March 2011. The Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011 was signed into 
law on 20 April 2011; see GG 34243 of 20 April 2011. 
 3 Available at www.iodsa.co.za (hereafter the King III report or King III code). It is two 
separate documents, but together they are referred to as King III. See Loubser “The King 
reports on corporate governance” in Esser and Havenga (hereafter Loubser in Esser and 
Havenga) 22. See Naidoo 293 for a table of governance compliance and what governance 
action is regulated in legislation. The King code and the JSE listings requirements. Listings 
requirement 3.84 deal with the corporate governance requirements. See www.jse.co.za for 
the listings requirements. 
 4 Esser and Havenga 1. 
 5 Olson “South Africa moves to a global model of corporate governance but with important 
national variations” 2010 Acta Juridica 219 241–242 who also argues that the new Act is 
rather robust in providing shareholder protection. 
 6 In South Africa companies have a unitary board structure. See, eg, Naudé Die regsposisie 
van die maatskappydirekteur (1970) 208 on the differences between a unitary board 
structure and a two-tier board structure. 
 7 The Policy document of the Department of Trade and Industry. The guidelines for 
corporate law reform, South African company law reform for a 21st Century (GG 26493 of 
23 June 2004, hereafter the Policy document). 
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(b) reducing costs associated with the formalities of forming a company and 
maintaining its existence. 
2. Promoting innovation and investment in South African markets and companies 
by providing for— 
(a) flexibility in the design and organisation of companies; and 
(b) a predictable and effective regulatory environment. 
3. Promoting the efficiency of companies and their management. 
4. Encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance. 
5. Making company law compatible and harmonious with best practice 
jurisdictions internationally.” 
As part of the mission it was specifically stated that “[t]he law should protect 
shareholder rights, advance shareholder activism, and provide enhanced 
protections for minority shareholders”.  
The purposes of the Act, stipulated in section 7, are therefore in line with the 
guidelines provided in the Policy document. The purposes of the Act8 are to 
“(a) promote compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided for in the 
Constitution, in the application of company law; 
(b) promote the development of the South African economy by- 
  (i) encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency; 
 (ii) creating flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of 
companies; and 
(iii) encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance as 
appropriate, given the significant role of enterprises within the social 
and economic life of the nation; 
(c) promote innovation and investment in the South African markets; 
(d) reaffirm the concept of the company as a means of achieving economic and 
social benefits; 
(e) continue to provide for the creation and use of companies, in a manner that 
enhances the economic welfare of South Africa as a partner within the global 
economy; 
(f) promote the development of companies within all sectors of the economy, and 
encourage active participation in economic organisation, management and 
productivity; 
(g) create optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for productive 
purposes, and for the investment of that capital in enterprises and the 
spreading of economic risk; 
(h) provide for the formation, operation and accountability of non-profit 
companies in a manner designed to promote, support and enhance the capacity 
of such companies to perform their functions; 
(i) balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within 
companies; 
(j) encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies; 
(k) provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed 
companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant 
stakeholders; and 
(l) provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of 
companies.” 
The provisions of the Act have to be tested against the vision and mission as 
stated in the Policy document, but also, more importantly, against the purposes 
________________________ 
 8 See s 7. 
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listed in section 7 of the Act. We will conclude whether the protection afforded 
to shareholders in the Act is in line with these purposes and thus with the general 
philosophy of the Act. 
The Act defines a “shareholder” as the holder of a share issued by the compa-
ny and whose name is entered as such in the (certificated or uncertificated) secu-
rities register. The “holder” of shares (without it being entered as such in the 
(certificated or uncertificated) securities register) or of voting rights or other 
“beneficial interests” is used in different contexts throughout the Act. A “holder 
of shares” and a “shareholder” are therefore, for purposes of the Act, not syno-
nyms.9  
The aim of this article is to consider the protection that shareholders receive in 
the Act in respect of personal rights and corporate rights are not addressed.10 We 
do this with reference to a number of selected themes taken from the Act. These 
themes include: the governance of companies, stakeholder protection, remedies 
available to shareholders, directors’ remuneration and shareholder activism. The 
rationale for selecting these themes, namely, to assist us in reaching a conclusion 
on the level of protection that shareholders receive in the Act and whether these 
comply with the philosophy of the Act, is explained below. 
In the context of our first theme, governance of companies, we specifically 
consider the division of power between the shareholders and the board of direc-
tors. The two (main) organs of the modern company are the general meeting 
(meeting of shareholders) and the board of directors.11 The Act provides that the 
business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of 
its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any 
of the functions of the company. This is subject to the extent that the Act or the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation12 provides otherwise.13 The Act there-
fore introduced a shift in ultimate power in the company from the shareholders to 
the board.14 The board of directors now have the ultimate power in the company, 
________________________ 
 9 See the discussion of “shareholder” and of “securities” in Delport (ed) Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) (hereafter Henochsberg) 28(3). This article is 
extensively based on Delport’s original contributions to Henochsberg. This distinction is 
significant, especially in respect of enforcement of rights. See, eg, s 161 where reference is 
made to a “holder of securities”, while s 163 refers to a “shareholder”. See the discussion 
of the effect of this on these sections in Henochsberg 557 and 568 respectively and Cassim 
et al Contemporary company law (2012) (hereafter Contemporary company law) 758. The 
extended definition of a shareholder as in s 57 which, in essence, includes the beneficial 
shareholder only applies to that part, ie, in respect of the governance of companies. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the term “shareholder” in this article will refer to the definition in s 1.  
 10 See, eg, Communicare v Khan 2013 4 SA 482 (SCA) and Henochsberg 167 on personal 
and corporate rights. 
 11 Contemporary company law 355. See also Henochsberg 276 on the arguments in favour of 
the social and ethics committee being a company committee and not a board committee. 
The audit committee is also appointed by the shareholders and therefore also an organ of 
the company. See s 94 and Henochsberg 276 and on board meetings see s 73 and 
Henochsberg 280. See Cilliers et al Cilliers and Benade Corporate law (2000) 83 for the 
significance of the distinction between organs and agents. 
 12 Hereafter the MOI. 
 13 See s 66(1). 
 14 See s 66(1). See Henochsberg 250(4) for a detailed discussion of s 66. It is uncertain to 
what an extent management functions can be excluded in the MOI or transferred to the 
shareholders to perform. See s 15(1) that provides that the provisions in the MOI must be 
continued on next page 
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subject to the Act and the MOI.15 Therefore where the Act provides that “the 
company” must act, that would now be the board of directors and not the share-
holders (collectively), unless the Act makes it clear that the opposite will apply.16 
This provision on the shift in power from the shareholders to the board of direc-
tors has some serious consequences and we will discuss these in detail in the 
context of shareholder protection. We argue that, despite this shift, which is not 
in line with the philosophy of the Act, there are still various provisions in the Act 
that aim to protect shareholders.17 We furthermore evaluate self-regulatory rec-
ommendations on the structure and composition of the board to determine 
whether these recommendations provide for the most appropriate board structure 
that will encourage good governance and ultimately benefit the shareholders. We 
also appraise the provisions in the Act on the appointment and removal of direc-
tors to see whether these provisions provide shareholders with sufficient rights 
with regard to who sit on the board of directors. 
Our second theme deals with the position of stakeholders. This concerns the 
issue of the nature of the company and in whose interests directors need to man-
age a company. The generally accepted view has traditionally been that compa-
nies are managed primarily in the interests of their shareholders collectively. 
Thus the duty of directors is to maximise profits for the shareholders.18 Over 
time there has been a shift in public opinion towards the recognition of a variety 
of other interests that should be considered by company management. These in-
clude environmental concerns and the interests of other stakeholders like inves-
tors, employees, consumers and the general public. Our view is to consider the 
relevant approach to stakeholder protection, as advocated by the Act and King 
III, as this will have a significant impact on the shareholders. An approach 
providing direct protection to other stakeholders will obviously be less beneficial 
to shareholders compared to an approach where shareholders are still the ulti-
mate beneficiaries. The relevant approaches are discussed below.19 
Our third theme is shareholder remedies. The aim is not to evaluate and ana-
lyse all these remedies available to shareholders in detail and to indicate specific 
________________________ 
in line with the Act; otherwise it would be void in so far as it is inconsistent. Also the 
directors owe the fiduciary duties to the company, and it will not make sense to give the 
shareholders the majority or all of the managerial powers because the directors can transfer 
their powers to the shareholders, or anybody else for that matter, but not their duties. It is 
also unclear how the shareholders will give effect to the full managerial function, as they 
will not have access to all the company records and accounts. See the discussion in 
Henochsberg 250(4).  
 15 See para 3 1 1 below. 
 16 See s 75, as one example, where the ultimate power is with the shareholders. 
 17 Olson 2010 Acta Juridica 242. 
 18 The interests of the company are those of the shareholders as the “corporators”, both pre-
sent (Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 291) and future (Gaiman v Na-
tional Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch 330). Greenhalgh, however, was not in re-
spect of the duties of a director, but about minority protection and majority rule but is used 
nonetheless as authority in respect of directors’ duties: see Lombard and Joubert “The 
legislative response to the shareholders v stakeholders debate: A comparative overview” 
2014 J of Corporate Law Studies 212. See Davies and Worthington Gower & Davies Prin-
ciples of modern company law (2012) 540ff for a discussion of the common-law position. 
See also In re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA) 306; [1942] 1 All ER 542 543; SA 
Fabrics Ltd v Millman 1972 4 SA 592 (A); see Henochsberg 295 and cases cited there.  
 19 See para 3 2 below. 
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shortcomings with some of these remedies, but rather to test it against the phi-
losophy of the Act and to determine, based on the availability of remedies, 
whether shareholders are well protected or not. 
Our fourth theme concerns directors’ remuneration and to what extent share-
holders have a say on it. Here we consider the provisions of the Act as well as 
recommendations made in King III. 
Our final theme deals with shareholder activism. Shareholder activism could 
contribute to good corporate governance20 which will ultimately benefit the 
company and thus indirectly shareholder investment in the company. We consid-
er various provisions in the Act to determine whether there is enough scope for 
shareholders to be active. We also consider the recommendations in King III as 
well as the Code on responsible investment in South Africa (CRISA).21  
Based on this holistic view of the selected themes we conclude on the protec-
tion that shareholders receive in the Act and whether or not this is sufficient, es-
pecially if one takes into account the typical ownership structure of a South Afri-
can company as well as the general philosophy of the Act. 
Our approach is based on a legal analysis of relevant legislative provisions in 
contrast to a leximetric, empirical or quantitative approach.22 We thus follow a 
________________________ 
 20 On this see Esser “Shareholder interests and good corporate governance in South Africa” 
2014 THRHR 49. The focus of this article is therefore shareholder rights and not corporate 
rights. 
 21 See www.iodsa.co.za for the Code (hereafter CRISA). It was launched on 19 July 2011 
with the effective date for reporting being 1 February 2012. 
 22 In the context of quantitative research there are various indices available that quantify the 
law with regard to shareholder protection. See La Porte et al “Law and finance” 1998 J of 
Political Economy 1113 for one of the most popular shareholder protection indices. They 
identified eight variables and applied it to 49 countries. These variables code the law with 
regard to shareholder protection. This index has, however, been criticised. See, eg, Cools 
“The real difference in corporate law between the United States and Continental Europe: 
Distribution of powers” 2005 Delaware J of Corporate L 697; Braendle “Shareholder 
protection in the USA and Germany – ‘law and finance’ revisited” 2006 German LJ 257; 
Spamann “On the insignificance and/or endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘anti-director rights 
index’ under consistent coding” (Harvard Law School John M Olin Center Discussion 
Paper 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=894301 (accessed on 30 April 2015). 
This is discussed in detail by Lele and Siems “Shareholder protection: A leximetric 
approach” available at http://bit.ly/1KEwJOU (accessed on 1 May 2015). Lele and Siems 
argue that the selection of variables by La Porte et al does not capture the most significant 
aspects of the law. Their choice of variables is also very much drafted in favour of the 
position in the United States. Th fact that other issues like the difference between 
mandatory and default rules which have not been taken into account is also criticised as 
well as the definitions of the variables, which are too broad and vague. With these points of 
criticism in mind, Lele and Siems developed an index to measure shareholder protection in 
five countries over a period of three decades. They quantified legal rules by attempting to 
include variables which best reflect the shareholder protection in five countries. They 
included the UK, the US, France, Germany and India in their study. They thus made use of 
a leximetric approach. See Annex I of their article for the variables and sub-variables used 
in their index. In this publication they state that shareholder protection has increased in the 
past three decades in the five sample countries. They also state that minority shareholder 
protection against majority shareholder protection is stronger in “blockholder countries” (ie 
Germany, France and India in the countries selected). They did not, in this article, consider 
whether a better “score” received regarding shareholder protection matters in the context of 
good governance. In other words, whether it has a positive or negative effect on good 
continued on next page 
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doctrinal methodology.23 In so doing we are able to evaluate whether or not 
shareholders receive adequate protection, keeping the ownership structure of typ-
ical South African companies in mind and especially also because the mission of 
the Act was stated to include that the law should protect shareholder rights, ad-
vance shareholder activism and provide enhanced protection for minority share-
holders, as argued above. 
2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF A COMPANY 
“The nature and manner of corporate shareholding differ markedly even among 
the most developed market economies, and surely leave a mark on the structure 
of corporate law.”24 The ownership structure of a company has an impact on the 
orientation and efficacy of shareholder rights, remedies and activism. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, there are large numbers of publicly traded 
corporations with dispersed share ownership.25 In other words, with dispersed 
share ownership no single shareholder or group of shareholders can exercise 
control over the corporation. In continental Europe this is often not the case. In 
Germany, for example, corporations usually have a controlling shareholder like a 
closely coordinated group of companies or even the State as in France.26 In Italy 
the controlling shareholders are usually individuals or families.27  
In South Africa the position is markedly different, because, due to historical 
factors, such as exchange control, the flow of capital internationally was not pos-
sible and it tended to lead to concentrated shareholding.28 Also, the role of the 
institutional investor in the form of large life insurance companies, pension 
funds, unit trusts and even the Public Investment Commission (also called “man-
dated investments”) has had the effect that direct shareholder control has been 
diluted to a large extent. There is therefore a lack of dispersed shareholding, and 
________________________ 
corporate governance. Siems “Working paper” 359, available at http://bit.ly/1RduY0w 
(accessed on 1 May 2015), then builds on the work done by himself and Lele and 
developed a second index. The second one deals with 20 countries instead of the original 5. 
It is, however, narrower in the sense that it only has 10 variables and covers at the period 
1995 to 2005. He did include South Africa in the sample, but this was before the 2008 
Companies Act. See further Van der Elst “Law and economics of shareholder rights and 
ownership structures: How trivial are shareholder rights for shareholders?” (2010), 
available at http://bit.ly/1O6C49t (accessed on 20 April 2015). He built on the work done 
by Lele and Siems and indicated that shareholder rights grew steadily in many countries 
over the last 15 years. His work does, however, cast some doubt on the influence of 
shareholder rights on ownership structures. It also shows that shareholder activism can 
actually have a greater influence than shareholder rights. In other words, activist 
shareholders can have a bigger influence than ordinary company monitoring at general 
meetings. 
 23 See Hutchinson and Duncan “Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal legal 
research” 2012 Deakin LR 83 84. 
 24 See Kraakman et al The anatomy of corporate law (2009) 29. 
 25 See Coffee “Dispersed ownership: The theories, the evidence, and the enduring tension 
between ‘Lumpers’ and ‘Splitters’” (2010), available at http://bit.ly/1Wh1dTg (accessed on 
1 May 2015), on dispersed ownership versus concentrated ownership.  
 26 See La Porta et al “Corporate ownership around the world” 1999 The Journal of Finance 
471, available at http://bit.ly/1k8C7Ev (accessed on 30 April 2015), on the concentration of 
ownership versus more dispersed ownership in large corporations around the world. 
 27 See Kraakman 29ff. 
 28 See Naudé 283 in respect of the influence of institutional investors. 
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the majority shareholding is either through the institutional investors or through 
insider shareholders29 with as much as 52 per cent in 2002 on an equal-weighted 
average.30 In respect of institutional shareholders, CRISA31 has had an effect in 
respect of shareholder activism due to the fact that in terms of principle 2 of 
CRISA, the institutional investor should indicate to the ultimate beneficiary how 
the institutional investor exercises its voting rights in the companies in which it 
invests. Nominee shareholding could also dilute the rights of the ultimate owner 
of the shares, due to the fact that the nominee shareholder, as registered share-
holder, would usually vote the shares in the manner that he thinks proper, if there 
is no instruction, as was more the rule than the exception, from the beneficial 
shareholder how the votes were to be exercised. The Act aims to give the benefi-
cial shareholder a more direct influence on the actions by the nominee, which 
could promote shareholder participation.32  
The protection of shareholders in a company with a dispersed shareholding is 
often different to that in companies where there is a dominant shareholder, 
whether through institutional investment, insider holding or merely large (con-
trolling) blocks of shares. In respect of insider ownership (or block/concentrated 
ownership) the relationship between the majority shareholders and the minority 
shareholders should be sufficiently regulated as it is a basic premise of South Af-
rican corporate law that the majority shareholder has no duties, fiduciary or oth-
erwise, towards the minority shareholder.33 In an outsider model (or dispersed 
shareholdings) minority shareholders should similarly be protected as the effect 
could be that a minority (block) holding can effect control.34 In evaluating share-
holder protection, it should also be noted that the notion of voting (or other con-
trol rights) may be outdated as the shareholder, either directly by voting with his 
feet or indirectly through other methods like codes, can and will influence man-
agement to an extent much greater than the threat of dismissal by an exercise of 
votes.35  
________________________ 
 29 Statistics show that 40% of the JSE Ltd is held via pension funds and unit trusts or 61% 
when foreign funds are excluded (JSE 2012 from ownership presentation by Trevor 
Chandler). The shares in Sanlam Ltd, a major listed insurance company, are held as 
follows: 420657 or 86,6% of the shareholders hold between 1 and 100 shares: Sanlam 
Limited 2014 Annual report 37.  
 30 Stulz “The limits of financial globalization” 2005 The Journal of Finance 1595 1604. This 
is a relic of the past where large conglomerates, some established by families, such as the 
Anglo American corporation, were controlled by family members. See Rumney “Who 
owns South Africa: An analysis of state and private ownership patterns” in Daniel et al 
(eds) State of the Nation 2004–2005 (2005) 401.  
 31 See para 3 5 below.  
 32 See para 3 5 below.  
 33 Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 ChD 70; Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 
1969 3 SA 629 (A); Amdocs SA Joint Enterprise (Pty) Ltd v Kwezi Technologies (Pty) Ltd 
2014 5 SA 532 (GJ) and Henochsberg 168. 
 34 See, as to the different levels of control, inter alia Berle and Means The modern 
corporation and private property (1932) 75 and Botha Groups in South African company 
law (LLD thesis UP 1981) 142. 
 35 See Joubert “Reigniting the corporate conscience: Reflections on some aspects of social 
and ethics committees of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange” in Visser 
and Pretorius (eds) Essays in honour of Frans Malan (2014) 184.  
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3 SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3 1 Governance of companies 
3 1 1 Division of power between the shareholders and the board of directors 
Ultimate (indirect) control of a company is usually in the hands of the 
shareholders as they have the power to appoint and remove directors.36 The level 
of protection that shareholders receive in terms of the 2008 Companies Act is, 
however, different compared to the 1973 Companies Act as shareholders no 
longer have an original decision-making power.37 This is due to the enactment of 
section 66. Section 66(1) apparently creates a positive duty on the board of 
directors to manage the company as it provides that the business and affairs of 
the company must be managed by or under the direction of its board.38 It also 
means, due to the use of the words “business and affairs”, that the ultimate 
power is no longer with the shareholders in general meeting, unless otherwise 
stated in the Act or the MOI. The powers of the directors are now given by 
statute and not delegated or derived from an agreement between the shareholders 
and the directors.39 The ultimate responsibility for good corporate governance 
thus lies with the board of directors.40  
The significance of the power to manage the business and affairs in terms of 
section 66 is twofold.41 The power is now original and no longer delegated from 
the shareholders. This shift from the previous position also happened in Canada, 
one of the models for the Act, and the significance thereof was summarised as 
follows: “The directors’ power is original, not delegated: as such, it is not subject 
to controls by the shareholders, except as specified in the applicable statute.”42 
This is also true with regard to South Africa.43 This means, inter alia, that the 
shareholders no longer have the inherent residual power to take a decision in 
case of a deadlock. This principle was, however, not applied consistently in the 
Act, and section 81(1)(d)44 refers to the deadlock ground as a ground for the 
winding-up of a solvent company. In Henochsberg it is stated that “if the direc-
tors are in deadlock, the power to take over the powers of the directors does not 
________________________ 
 36 Kraakman 56. This is discussed in more detail below. 
 37 Act 61 of 1973 (hereafter the 1973 Companies Act). 
 38 In terms of the 1973 Companies Act the directors acted as functionaries (organs or agents) 
of the company. See Henochsberg 250(2) and Contemporary company law 403. 
 39 Delport “The division of powers in a company” in Visser and Pretorius (eds) Essays in 
honour of Frans Malan (2014) 81–92. 
 40 See Loubser in Esser and Havenga 30. 
 41 Henochsberg 250(3). 
 42 Welling Corporate law in Canada (2006) 315. Welling also indicates that this was a 
conscious movement away from the British model, as was established also in John Shaw & 
Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw 1935 2 KB 113 (CA) and Scott v Scott 1943 1 All ER 582 (Ch). 
 43 South Africa followed the Canadian model by giving the ultimate control to manage the 
company to the board (see, eg, Ontario Business Corporations Act, s 115(1) and the 
Canadian Business Corporations Act RSC 1985 c C-44, s 102(1)). See Delport (fn 39 
above) 90.  
 44 This subsection makes provision for the company, one or more of its directors or one or 
more of its shareholders, to apply for the winding-up of a solvent company in 
circumstances where the parties referred to are in deadlock, or where it is “otherwise just 
and equitable for the company to be wound up”. See the discussion in Henochsberg 328 
and cases referred to. 
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transfer to the shareholders as the ‘highest’ authority in the company”.45 The 
same principle applies if the MOI or Act does not provide who must exercise the 
power.  
Secondly, the ultimate power is now in the hands of the board of directors and 
no longer with the shareholders. Therefore, unless the qualifications of section 
66 are complied with, the board of directors is now the ultimate organ of the 
company.46 The significance of this is that the shareholders, as erstwhile ultimate 
holders of authority and power47, cannot at common law ratify any actions by the 
directors beyond their authority or in transgression of their duties in acting on au-
thority of the shareholders, except to the extent that the Act or the MOI expressly 
provides otherwise.48 
Also, statutory provisions can provide that the company can or may do certain 
things. It is thus important to determine whether this falls on the board or the 
shareholders.49 Based on section 66(1) it seems that the default position is that 
“the company” now refers to the board of directors and no longer to the share-
holders. Thus, “if the board acts, the company acts”.50  
Although shareholders may have substantial protection in the Act, section 
66(1) is clearly problematic.51 This is especially the case in companies where 
there is more of a dispersed shareholding52 as the board of directors will have ul-
timate control and the other rights and remedies provided for in the Act, and to 
be elaborated on below, will not necessarily be of assistance to smaller share-
holders.  
3 1 2 The structure of the board  
South African company law has a unitary board structure. King III has extensive 
self-regulatory requirements relating to the structure and composition of the 
board. A brief discussion of these recommendations is necessary as shareholders 
will benefit mostly in a company with a proper board structure and a well 
composed board.  
________________________ 
 45 Henochsberg 328. 
 46 Ibid 250(3). See the example given ibid where reference is made to the Alienation of Land 
Act 68 of 1981. A deed of alienation has to be signed by the parties thereto or their agents. 
In terms of the 1973 Companies Act this requirement would have been complied with if 
signed by an agent acting under the express or implied authority of the company as the 
company itself cannot sign (see s 69(1)). Now, in terms of the new s 66(1), the board is the 
highest authority. Thus, if the board acts, the company acts. The board can thus sign such a 
contract without any authority from the company (or any other organ like the 
shareholders).   
 47 See, eg, John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw 1935 2 KB 113 (CA); Scott v Scott 1943 1 
All ER 582 (Ch) 584–585; Cilliers et al 21, Naudé 47; Du Plessis Maatskappyregtelike 
grondslae van die regsposisie van direkteure en besturende direkteure (LLD thesis UFS 
1990) 17 and Du Plessis “Beskikkingsvryheid oor interne bestuursorganisasie, interne be-
voegdheidsverdeling en die prominensie van die statute in die maatskappyereg” 1992 
TSAR 100.  
 48 See, eg, s 20(2) for express authority to ratify certain ultra vires or unauthorised acts.  
 49 Delport (fn 39 above) 91. 
 50 Henochsberg 250(3). 
 51 See, eg, s 78(4) in respect of the indemnification of directors. 
 52 See Kraakman 29ff and La Porta et al (fn 24, 26 above) on the concentration of ownership 
versus more dispersed ownership in large corporations around the world; and Coffee (fn 25 
above) on dispersed ownership versus concentrated ownership.  
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Good corporate governance, profit maximisation and the overall success of the 
company depend to a large extent on the board’s capabilities.53 The incentives of 
the board members, the size, structure and functions of the board and the role of 
board committees are especially relevant here. 
This unitary board consists of executive and non-executive directors, which is 
not a requirement by law but in terms of King III. King III, which applies to all 
entities in the public, private and non-profit sectors, deals extensively with the 
structure of the board.54. Compliance with King III is voluntary unless there is a 
secondary basis for enforcement. This can be either in terms of legislation or 
contractual. Legislative enforcement is, for instance, in regulation 54(1)(b) of the 
Act that requires the prospectus to contain information about the application of 
the principles of King III.55 Compliance with the JSE listings requirements56 as a 
contract between the JSE Ltd and the listed company57 is mandatory and compli-
ance with King III is incorporated in the JSE listings requirements.58 King III, 
however, operates, whatever the basis of enforcement, on an “apply or explain” 
approach (and not a “comply or explain” as was the case with the previous Re-
ports).59 An entity can thus adapt the recommendations and principles to its spe-
cific circumstances and apply them in a different way while achieving the same 
objectives. Regarding board composition King III recommends that there should 
be a balance of power between executive and non-executive directors, with the 
majority of the directors being non-executive directors.60 The majority of non-
executive directors should also be independent.61 It is also recommended in King 
III that the size of the board should be determined in accordance with the 
knowledge, skills and resources required to conduct its business, but every board 
should have at least two directors.62 King III recommends that non-executive di-
rectors should rotate at least every three years.63 The independence of independ-
ent directors should also be assessed annually by the chairperson.64  
The distinction between executive, non-executive and independent directors as 
dealt with in King III is not used in the Act in respect of directors. However, the 
requirements stipulated for members of the audit committee65 clearly identify 
them as independent non-executive directors and the membership requirements 
________________________ 
 53 Kraakman 66. 
 54 King III principle 2.18. 
 55 GN R351 of 26 April 2011 in terms of s 223 (hereafter the Companies Regulations, 2011). 
 56 See para 8.63 of the JSE listings requirements. Listed companies are obliged to disclose 
how they have applied the Code and explain in their reports the reasons for any non-
compliance. See Joubert (fn 35 above) 186. 
 57 See, eg, Herbert Porter & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1974 4 SA 781 (W); 
Pretorius et al Hahlo’s Company law through the cases (1999) 41. 
 58 Loubser in Esser and Havenga 24. 
 59 King III Introduction and background 7. See also Loubser in Esser and Havenga 24ff. 
 60 See King III principle 2.18. An executive director is involved in the day-to-day 
management of the company and/or is a full-time salaried employee of the company and a 
non-executive director is not involved in the day-to-day management of the company. See 
Loubser in Esser and Havenga 36. 
 61 See King III ch 2 para 64.  
 62 See King III principle 2.18.3 and 2.18.4 (ch 2 para 72). 
 63 See King III principle 2.18.6 (ch 2 para 75). 
 64 See King III principle 2.18.9 (ch 2 para 78). 
 65 See s 94(4) that contains criteria for, it is presumed, the requirement of “independence”. 
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for the social and ethics committee66 also include that one director who must be 
classified as a non-executive director in terms of the criteria of King III.67 
King III does not, subject to the above, prescribe the number of directors to 
serve on a board. The Act does, however, state that a private company or a per-
sonal liability company should always have at least one director and a public or 
non-profit company at least two, but this is in addition to the minimum number 
of directors necessary to satisfy a requirement in the Act or MOI to appoint an 
audit or social and ethics committee.68 The Act also makes provision for four 
types of directors: those appointed by a person named in the MOI, ex officio di-
rectors, alternate directors and directors elected by the shareholders.69  
The recommendations in King III in respect of the composition of the board, 
although not practically applicable to all companies, clearly will have the effect 
that the company has a more balanced board, in terms of the restriction of the in-
fluence on the board of “insider” directors. This will, in respect of corporate 
governance, only be for the benefit of the company and ultimately the sharehold-
ers.70  
3 1 3 Election, appointment and removal of directors 
Notwithstanding the fact that section 66(1) is clearly problematic especially re-
garding its implications for shareholders, as argued before, shareholders are still 
ultimately responsible to elect the board as they still have the right to elect71 at 
least 50 per cent of the directors and alternate directors of a profit company (oth-
er than a state-owned company) and to remove those directors72.  
________________________ 
 66 S 72(4). 
 67 See reg 43(4) of the Companies Regulations, 2011. 
 68 See s 66(2).  
 69 S 66(4). 
 70 See, eg, Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 2006 5 
SA 333 (W); South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v Mpofu [2009] 4 All SA 169 
(GSJ) and Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum Oil And Gas Corporation of South Africa 
(SOC) Limited [2015] JOL 33744 (WCC). 
 71 See ss 66(4). “Appointment” by all the shareholders in terms of, eg, a shareholders’ 
agreement will be the equivalent of election: Gohlke & Schneider v Westies Minerale 
(Edms) Bpk 1970 2 SA 685 (A) 689. Appointment by some of the shareholders in terms of, 
eg, a provision in the shareholders’ agreement will still be the equivalent of election, as the 
other shareholders will have divested themselves of that right and this will be valid 
provided the terms and effect thereof is not against public policy: see, eg, Pienaar v 
Bohbot [2007] 3 All SA 60 (T) and Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). The loading 
of votes is not restricted in the 2008 Companies Act, with the effect that it can be provided 
that if directors are appointed, the class A shares will have, eg, two votes while the class B 
shares will only have one vote. See as to the doctrine of equality also s 37(1). 
 72 See ss 71. Loaded voting rights are allowed, under certain circumstances, for the dismissal 
of directors in terms of s 71 of the 2008 Act. This loading cannot, it is submitted, be within 
a class due to the doctrine of equality in s 37(1). See, eg, Bushell v Faith 1970 AC 
1099 (HL); Stewart v Schwab 1956 4 SA 791 (T); Swerdlow v Cohen 1977 3 SA 1050 (T) 
and Ncube “You’re fired! The removal of directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” 
2011 SALJ 33–51. However, there is no restriction in respect of loading as between classes. 
See s 37(2) where there is no restriction on loading, either express or implied. See also in 
respect of voting Henochsberg 166. In Contemporary company law 442 it is argued that 
shareholders can also remove directors not elected by them. The practical problems that 
this may cause are apparent. 
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The Act does not, however, state that there cannot be weighted or loaded votes 
in respect of the votes of directors.73 Certain directors might thus have more 
votes than others. This can have an effect on the actual control that shareholders 
have in respect of the election of directors, because although the requirement is 
that they must elect at least 50 per cent of the directors on the board, the MOI 
can provide that the other (appointed or ex officio) directors or particular elected 
director/s have weighted/loaded votes, which would negate the power of the 
shareholder over directors.74 This is also exacerbated by the fact that the MOI 
can provide for voting otherwise than on an individual basis for the election of 
directors, and the shareholder will therefore have no control if a director with 
weighted/loaded votes is included in the present structure and there is no election 
for that individual director, but election is for the board as a unit.75 This, coupled 
with the fact that directors can serve, unless the MOI provides otherwise, for an 
indefinite term,76 may leave the shareholder powerless. 
In King III it is recommended that directors should be appointed/elected 
through a formal process that is transparent.77 It is specifically recommended that 
a nomination committee should assist in identifying suitable people to serve on 
the board.78 Background and reference checks should be done before the ap-
pointment. King III provides an extensive list of information that should be dis-
closed about each director in an integrated report.79 This includes education, 
qualifications, length of service and age, significant other directorships, etcetera. 
This would enable shareholders to properly assess each director.80 However, this 
will only enhance shareholder control if a company elects to apply King III.81 
In terms of section 71, shareholders82 may remove a director83 from office at 
any time by way of an ordinary resolution.84 This right given to shareholders is 
________________________ 
 73 See s 73(5)(c). Each director has one vote, unless the MOI provides otherwise. S 73(5)(c) 
is thus an alterable provision.  
 74 The fact that there can be weighted/loaded votes is accepted in, eg, s 2(2)(a)(ii)(bb) and in s 
3(1)(a)(ii) which regulated related parties and holding/subsidiary relationships respectively.  
 75 S 68(2). 
 76 S 68(1). 
 77 See King III principle 2.19. 
 78 See King III principle 2.23. A nomination committee must consist of a majority of non-
executive independent directors. These members are, however, elected by the board of 
directors (see King III) and the input by the shareholders, other than the major shareholder, 
will have little effect. The nominations will be dictated by the major shareholder or, in 
many instances, even by the investment community. The present practice of “forced” 
sabbatical of a managing director, only to return as non-executive chairperson two years 
later will perpetuate the same management and management principles and the nomination 
process and makes a mockery of value of a true non-executive independent chairperson.  
 79 See King III principle 2.19 (ch 2 para 88). 
 80 Loubser in Esser and Havenga 39. 
 81 The MOI can also provide for election processes (s 68(2)) and qualification of directors (s 
69(6)). Ss 29 and 30 prescribe the minimum requirements for eg the annual financial 
statements. Additional information can obviously be required in the MOI: see s 15(2)(d) 
and Henochsberg 71. 
 82 The board of directors (s 71(6)) and the Companies Tribunal (s 71(8)) may also remove a 
director in certain circumstances. 
 83 See discussion supra. 
 84 See s 65(7). The resolution has to be supported by more than 50% of the voting rights 
exercised on the resolution, being the votes represented at the meeting in person and proxy. 
In terms of s 65(8) the MOI may stipulate a higher percentage for an ordinary resolution to 
continued on next page 
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in addition to the right to apply to place a director under probation or to declare 
that director delinquent.85 The right provided for in section 71 overrides any pro-
vision of the MOI or any rule and agreement between any shareholders and a di-
rector.86 A director has to receive notice of the meeting where the resolution to 
remove him will be tabled. He also has to receive a copy of the resolution. The 
resolution must also be accompanied by a statement setting out the reasons for 
the removal. This should enable the director to prepare and present a response to 
the removal.87 A director is, however, not entitled to a statement of the reasons 
for his removal if the resolution to remove him was accepted. However, the pro-
visions of section 60 authorising a resolution by informal vote or round-robin be-
tween shareholders does not apply. Section 71 does not state this expressly and 
the section 71 vote is not excluded in section 60, but by implication, due to the 
fact that the director has the right to address the meeting, the resolution must be 
taken at a formally convened meeting.88 
In view of the above it seems that shareholders can remove a director, from a 
company law viewpoint at least, with relative ease, especially in respect of a 
non-executive director. Other legislation can have an impact on the protection 
available to shareholders in the context of removals of directors: In the case of an 
executive director, or any other director who is also in an employee relationship 
with the company, the labour laws will dictate the ease and efficacy of a purport-
ed removal. Therefore, if a person holds the office as director and is also an em-
ployee of the company, the dismissal as director could be constructive dismissal 
as employee, with extensive labour law consequences. Therefore, in such a situa-
tion, the employer/employee relationship needs to be terminated in terms of the 
labour laws, which could be a lengthy and complicated process; whereafter the 
company law process can be effected.89 
________________________ 
be successful. This is, however, not possible regarding the removal of a director. This 
resolution may also not be informally passed in terms of s 60 (thus in writing without 
holding a meeting) and also not by way of a round robin. The board of directors may also 
remove a director in case of a company with more than two directors. No reasons or 
grounds are prescribed in the Act when a director is removed by the shareholders. 
However, when the removal is by the director’s fellow directors, the director may only be 
removed if he has become ineligible, disqualified, incapacitated to the extent that he cannot 
perform his functions and is unlikely to regain his capacity within a reasonable time, or has 
been negligent or derelict in the performance of the functions of a director. See s 71(3) and 
Ncube 2011 SALJ 33–51. 
 85 See s 162. This is discussed in more detail below in para 3 3. 
 86 S 71(1). Thus, an agreement between the shareholders and a director not to be removed is 
no longer valid. However, a shareholder agreement amongst the shareholders (and not with 
a director) not to remove a particular director might be valid. See Contemporary company 
law 441. Ss 157(1) and 6(1) will, however, be applicable. Any agreement concluded 
between the shareholders concerning a matter relating to the company has to be consistent 
with the Act and the MOI. A court may also declare any agreement intended to defeat the 
effect of a prohibition or requirement established by or in terms of an unalterable provision 
of the Act invalid. 
 87 S 71(4)(a). Directors now only have a right to make oral presentations and not written 
ones. 
 88 Henochsberg 271 and Contemporary company law 446. 
 89 Henochsberg 272 and authorities cited; Mthimunye-Bakoro v Petroleum Oil And Gas 
Corporation of South Africa (SOC) Limited [2015] JOL 33744 (WCC). 
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3 2 The position of stakeholders 
At common law, directors have to act honestly in the best interests of the compa-
ny. This has always been interpreted as the shareholders collectively, both pre-
sent and future.90 
The protection that has to be afforded to stakeholders has been widely debated 
in South Africa. The Policy document,91 issued prior to the commencement of 
the recent company law reform process, referred to it as an important issue that 
the drafters of the new Companies Act had to consider. The King reports empha-
sise corporate social responsibility (CSR) principles and that companies must act 
as responsible corporate citizens.92 
There are generally, two schools of thought on the issue of whose interests 
must be granted primacy when directors manage companies. In the enlightened-
shareholder-value approach, the primary role of the directors should be to pro-
mote the success of the company for the benefit of the shareholders as a whole 
and to generate maximum value for shareholders.93 The second school is that of 
plurism, which sees shareholders as one constituency among many and the inter-
ests of a number of groups are recognised.94 Thus, a company’s existence and 
success are seen as inextricably intertwined with the consideration of the inter-
________________________ 
 90 See fn 18 above. See further Du Plessis “Direkteure se pligte teenoor partye anders as die 
maatskappy” 1992 De Jure 378; Havenga “The company, the constitution and the 
stakeholders” 1996 (5) Juta’s Business Law 136; Havenga “Directors’ fiduciary duties 
under our future company-law regime” 1997 SA Merc LJ 317. This viewpoint was 
confirmed in the Policy document ch 3 para 3.2.2. See also Coase “The nature of the firm” 
1937 Economica 386; Alchain and Demsetz “Production, information costs, and economic 
organization” 1972 American Economic R 777; Jensen and Meckling “The theory of the 
firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure” 1976 J of Financial 
Economics 305–360; Wishart “Models and theories of directors’ duties to creditors” 1991 
New Zealand Universities LR 323; Dine “Company law developments in the European 
Union and the United Kingdom: Confronting diversity” 1998 TSAR 245 for a discussion of 
the shareholder-versus-stakeholder theories. 
 91 The Policy document, preceding the company law reform process, clearly advocated for an 
inclusive approach and suggested the following model: “[A] company should have as its 
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing the economic success 
of the corporation, taking into account, as appropriate, the legitimate interests of other 
stakeholder constituencies.” See ch 3 para 3.2.3. 
 92 The King III Report pays specific attention to CSR issues in ch 1 dealing with ethical 
leadership and corporate citizenship, ch 8 that deals with stakeholder relationships and ch 9 
dealing with integrated reporting and disclosure. On CSR in general, see McBarnet “The 
new corporate accountability: Corporate social responsibility beyond law, through law, for 
law” in McBarnet, Voiculescu and Campbell (eds) The new corporate accountability: 
Corporate social responsibility and the law (2007) 1–37 and Horrigan Corporate social 
responsibility in the 21 st Century. Debates, models and practices across government, law 
and business (2010). On the King III Report see Esser and Delport “The duty of care, skill 
and diligence: The King Report and the 2008 Companies Act” 2011 THRHR 449 and Esser 
“The protection of stakeholder interests in terms of the South African King III Report on 
corporate governance: An improvement to King II?” 2009 SA Merc LJ 188. See also Olson 
2010 Acta Juridica 221–225. 
 93 Cheffins “Teaching corporate governance” 1999 Legal Studies 515–525; Sheikh “Introduc-
tion to the corporate governance themed issues’ 1998 Int Company and Commercial LR 
267 268 and the Policy document 11 
 94 Miles “Company stakeholding” 2003 Company Lawyer 56; Dean “Stakeholding and the 
company law” 2001 Company Lawyer 66. 
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ests of its employees and other potentially qualifying stakeholders in the busi-
ness, such as suppliers and customers.95  
King III indicates that because a company is so integral to society, it should be 
considered as much a citizen of a country as any natural person. A company 
must therefore act as a responsible citizen.96 This involves that companies must 
follow the triple bottom-line approach by considering, social, environmental and 
economic factors when managing a company.  
King III opted for the so-called inclusive stakeholder value approach. This im-
plies that the board should consider the interests of all legitimate stakeholders 
like employees and creditors and not just those of the shareholders. The various 
interests of different stakeholders are determined on a case-by-case basis to act 
in the best interests of the company. A certain stakeholder may receive preferen-
tial treatment if that best serves the interests of the company.97 
Such an approach will usually be in the best interests of the shareholders, over 
the long term.98 There should therefore be a (causal) link between the board de-
cision taken and what is best for the company.99  
CSR issues, and thus also the extent of stakeholder protection, enjoy more 
prominence in the Act than in any previous company legislation in South Afri-
ca.100 Section 7(d) confirms that one of the purposes of the new Act is to reaffirm 
the concept of the company as a means of achieving economic and social benefit. 
Section 72(4) also provides for the establishment of a social and ethics commit-
tee.101 Regulation 43 deals with the social and ethics committee as referred to in 
section 72 of the Act.102 This regulation applies to all state-owned companies, 
public companies that are listed103 or any other company that complies with cer-
tain criteria.104 A public interest score of more than 500 points (in any two of the 
________________________ 
 95 Policy document 19. 
 96 King III Introduction and background 12. 
 97 Idem 11. 
 98 See also Joubert (fn 35 above) 191–192. 
 99 See Esser “Corporate social responsibility: A company law perspective” 2011 SA Merc LJ 
317ff. 
 100 See Lombard and Joubert 2014 J of Corporate Law Studies 221. 
 101 The subject of the social and ethics committee requires a study on its own. See, however, 
Esser (2011) 317–335; Locke in Esser and Havenga 107–118; Kloppers “Driving 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) through the Companies Act: An overview of the 
role of the social and ethics committee” 2013 PER 165–199; Stoop “Towards greener 
companies – Sustainability and the social and ethics committee” 2013 Stell LR 562–582; 
Havenga “The social and ethics committee in South African Company law” 2015 THRHR 
285–292; Joubert fn 35 above.  
 102 This requirement is in line with King III recommendations. Principle 1.1 of King III states 
that the board should provide effective leadership with an ethical foundation, which in-
cludes the responsibility to promote the stakeholder-inclusive model of corporate govern-
ance. 
 103 Reg 43(1). The fact that state-owned companies and public companies that are listed 
must, automatically, have a social en ethics committees seems to imply that it is accepted 
that these companies comply with the criteria in s 72(4)(a)-(c). While this may be true in 
respect of listed public companies, it does not follow logically in respect of state-owned 
companies. S 72(4) required expressly that the three criteria (or one of them) must be pre-
sent and the type of company is irrelevant. To apply the section to certain types of com-
panies does not seem to comply with s 72(4): See Henochsberg 276. 
 104 Reg 43(1)(c). 
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preceding five financial years) will be relevant in this regard. The “public inter-
est score” is calculated at the end of a financial year as the sum of a number of 
things.105 The number of employees and the turnover are some of the factors that 
will therefore determine whether a company is obliged to have such a committee. 
The public interest score is thus a method used to determine whether a company 
must comply with enhanced accountability requirements based on its social and 
economic impact. A minimum of three directors or prescribed officers must 
serve on a company’s social and ethics committee.106 The social and ethics 
committee’s function is to monitor the company’s activities, having regard to 
any relevant legislation, other legal requirements or prevailing codes of best 
practice. This relates to matters concerning social and economic development, 
including the company’s position regarding the goals and purposes as envisaged 
in, for example, the OECD principles and the Global compact principles as well 
as record of sponsorships, consumer relationships and labour and employment. 
The committee should also report annually to the shareholders at the company's 
annual general meeting on the matters within its mandate.107 
Section 76(3)(a) and (b) of the Act deals with the issue in whose interests di-
rectors should manage a company and provides as follows: “A director of a 
company, when acting in that capacity, must exercise the powers and perform 
the functions of director (a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; (b) in the best 
interests of the company.”108  
It is our view that the inclusive approach should be followed in interpreting 
section 76(3)(b). As mentioned above, in terms of the inclusive approach, direc-
tors must consider the interests of various stakeholders on a case-by-case basis. 
In the end the decision must be in the best interests of the company, even if it is 
to the detriment of the shareholders.109 The enlightened shareholder value ap-
________________________ 
 105 Reg 26(2). Certain companies are exempted, such as when the company is required in 
terms of other legislation to have, and does have, some form of formal mechanism within 
its structures that substantially performs the function that would otherwise be performed 
by the social and ethics committee (s 72 (5)(a)) and if it is a subsidiary of another compa-
ny (as defined in s 3 of the Companies Act) and if the holding company has a social and 
ethics committee that will perform the functions of the social and ethics committee for the 
(subsidiary) company (reg 43(2)(a)). If a company is required to appoint a social and eth-
ics committee, it may apply to the Companies Tribunal in the prescribed manner and form 
for an exemption and the Tribunal can give such an exemption for five years if it is satis-
fied that it is not reasonably necessary in the public interest to require the company to 
have a social and ethics committee, having regard to the nature and extent of the activities 
of the company (s 72(5)(b)). This exemption is problematic as the same criteria (quantita-
tively) that require a company to appoint a social and ethics committee must be used to 
determine whether it is not necessary, in the public interest, to do so. It is suggested that 
the nature of the activities (ie a qualitative criterium) should be applied in the exercise of 
the discretion by the Tribunal, as the quantitative criteria are fixed by the public interest 
formula: See Henochsberg 277. 
 106 See reg 43(4). At least one must be a director who has, at least for the previous three fi-
nancial years, not have been involved in the day-to-day management of the company’s 
business 
 107 See reg 43(5). See also Esser in Du Plessis et al Contemporary corporate governance 
(2015) 398. See also fn 101 above. 
 108 Emphasis added. 
 109 See Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd 2011 5 SA 422 (GNP) on how the 
court balances the interests of shareholders and creditors in the context of the new busi-
ness rescue proceedings. Employees also receive extensive protection in the 2008 Com-
continued on next page 
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proach is more restricted: stakeholder interests must be considered but, in the 
long term, it must be in the best interests of the shareholders collectively. 
Whether one argues that section 76(3)(b) enforces the wider inclusive approach 
or the more restricted enlightened shareholder value approach, in the end direc-
tors have to consider the interests of stakeholders when they manage a company. 
They must do it in such a manner that will best address the interests of the com-
pany. There must be a causal link between the decision made by the directors 
and the eventual outcome which must be in the best interests of the company.  
It should also be noted that section 5(1) states that the provisions of the Act 
must be interpreted in a way that gives best effect to the purposes listed in sec-
tion 7. Section 7(d) provides that directors have to manage a company in such a 
manner that promotes both economic and social benefits.110 It is doubtful that 
section 7(d) establishes a new, sui generis, duty on directors. It rather seems, 
against the background of the Policy document, that section 7(d) should also be 
interpreted to mean that directors must pay attention to the interests of stake-
holders, but that it does not provide stakeholders with direct rights.111 Further-
more, if the legislator wanted to create a new duty applicable to directors it 
would have been done explicitly (maybe by listing it in section 76 with the other 
duties) and not by merely incorporating it into the “purpose” provision. Section 
158(b)(i) also states that if a provision in the Act, read in its context, can be rea-
sonably construed as having more than one meaning, the meaning that best pro-
motes the purposes of the Act must be preferred by the courts.112  
It is therefore clear that stakeholders receive substantial protection in the Act: 
many of the provisions in section 7 are drafted in line with wider purposes than 
merely profit maximisation and the establishment of the social and ethics com-
mittee provides stakeholders with good protection and is really a way of legislat-
ing CSR. King III, although self-regulatory, is also clearly in favour of the inclu-
sive approach. 
In view of the above it is our view that although the interests of stakeholders 
have to be recognised and protected the basic principle still is that companies 
________________________ 
panies Act. See Katz “Governance under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Flexibility is the 
Keyword” 2010 Acta Juridica 248 261–262 who states that employees receive, for the 
first time, significant rights of participation in the governance of companies. See, eg, ss 
20(4), 45(5), 162(2), and 159 of the 2008 Companies Act. Employees also have extensive 
rights during business rescue proceedings. 
 110  As highlighted by Joubert (fn 35 above) 186, this objective should not be achieved to the 
exclusion of other objectives of the Act, such as “promotion of economic efficiency” in s 
7(b)(iii). 
 111 Unless the duties to the company are not complied with, which would give the 
stakeholdera (direct) claim for damage or loss against the director: see s 218(2) and 
Henochsberg 639.  
 112 See, eg, Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd [2013] 2 All SA 190 
(GNP); Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd (Registration No 2007/019270/06) (Grayhaven Riches 9 Ltd and 
Others as Interested Parties; First Rand Bank Limited as Intervening Creditor) [2012] 4 
All SA 590 (WCC) and African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 2013 4 All SA 432 (GNP) for the importance of s 7 in general. 
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have to make a profit and shareholders must receive a return on their invest-
ments.113 
3 3 Shareholder remedies 
Shareholders114 have substantial remedies in the Act. The new remedies provide 
shareholders with additional protection. See, for example, the appraisal reme-
dy,115 the remedy to place a director under probation or declare the director de-
linquent116 and the application to protect the rights as a shareholder.117 These are 
new remedies that were not applicable in terms of the 1973 Companies Act. Sec-
tion 20 also provides shareholders with direct remedies against the directors and 
prescribed officers for damages if they acted intentionally, fraudulently or gross-
ly negligent in contravention of the Act or against a limitation restriction or qual-
ification of the company (that is, ultra vires) or their authority.118  
In terms of section 163 a shareholder (or even a director) of a company may 
apply to a court for relief if any act or omission of the company, or a related per-
son, has had119 a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfair-
ly disregards the interests of, the applicant, if the business of the company, or a 
related person, is being or has been carried on or conducted in a manner that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of 
the applicant or if the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, 
or a person related to the company, are being or have been exercised in a manner 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the inter-
ests of, the applicant.120 In the case of a minority shareholder, it is accepted that 
many of the actions by the majority will or could be prejudicial to the minority 
shareholder. The test is, however, whether that action is (apart from oppressive 
________________________ 
 113 Loubser in Esser and Havenga 20. See also Olson 2010 Acta Juridica 221. See Joubert (fn 
35 above) 183 who states that the “main objective of companies listed on the JSE is to 
maximize profit and not primarily to achieve social or sustainability objectives”. This fact 
is actually recognised in the 2008 Companies Act in the definition of a profit company in 
s 1 and also in s 81(1)((d)(i)(bb). Shareholders do not have fiduciary duties toward com-
panies in which they hold shares: Amdocs SA Joint Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Kwezi Tech-
nologies (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 SA 532 (GJ) para 23 and Living Hands (Pty) Ltd v Ditz 2013 2 
SA 369 (GSJ) paras 21 22.  
 114 See fn 9 for the distinction between shareholders and holders of shares. 
 115 S 164. See generally on the appraisal remedy Henochsberg 574(5) and Contemporary 
company law 796ff.  
 116 S 162. See generally on declaring a director delinquent or to place a director under 
probation: Henochsberg 561 and Contemporary company law 23 and 435ff and Msimang 
v Katuliiba [2013] 1 All SA 580 (GSJ) for the application of s 162. 
 117 S 161. See Henochsberg 557 and Contemporary company law 817. 
 118 S 20(6). These remedies are problematic in a corporate law sense because, as stated in  
Henochsberg 96, it converts the shareholder’s proprietary interest into a direct pecuniary 
interest under certain circumstances, thereby ignoring the separate legal entity of the 
company. 
 119 Under certain circumstances it is not only the act itself that must be oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to or unfairly disregard the interests of the applicant, but it must also have that 
effect: see Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd [2013] 1 All SA 603 (GSJ). 
 120 See Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd [2013] 1 All SA 603 (GSJ); Omar v In-
house Venue Technical Management (Pty) Ltd 2015 3 SA 146 (WCC) and Beukes and 
Swart “Peel v Hamon J & C Engineering (Pty) Ltd: Ignoring the result-requirement of 
section 163(1)(a) of the Companies Act and extending the oppression remedy beyond its 
statutorily intended reach” 2014 PER 49. 
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which implies unfairness) also unfair.121 This remedy is also in respect of those 
acts by a related person,122 which could be a holding company, which is an ex-
tended remedy compared to that under the common law or under the repealed 
1973 Companies Act. The definition of “shareholder” restricts the ambit of the 
remedy, but the inclusion of “interests” of that shareholder and not only actions 
in respect of the rights of the shareholder extends the ambit of the remedy. In 
Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd123 “interests” were 
defined as to include interests not only flowing from the MOI of the company, 
but also from an understanding or agreement between the parties, which would 
mean a general fairness standard based on the reasonable expectations of the ap-
plicant and will not only be strict legal rights.124 
The appraisal remedy is only applicable in certain circumstances.125 In broad 
terms this remedy is triggered when a company passes a special resolution to 
amend the rights of a class of shares in terms of the MOI that materially or ad-
versely affects the rights of that shareholder or undertakes a fundamental transac-
tion.126 In these circumstances dissatisfied or minority shareholders do not have 
to go along with the decision made by the company as they have the right of opt-
ing out of the company by withdrawing the fair value of the shares by exercising 
their appraisal rights. By having this remedy shareholders can indirectly influ-
ence the decisions that directors make, especially in the context of fundamental 
transactions. Fundamental transactions clearly have an impact on all stakeholders 
and it is therefore important that the outcome of the transaction is in the best in-
terests of the company in the long term. The appraisal remedy creates a good 
check and balance to prevent directors (and controlling shareholders) from tak-
ing and making bad business decisions and judgments. The more shareholders 
who are against the triggering transaction the bigger the chance that the company 
will reconsider its proposed plans. On the other hand, this remedy can also have 
a negative effect on good corporate governance as the company might have to 
pay a lot of money to satisfy shareholder demands for appraisal to such an extent 
________________________ 
 121 See especially Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 2014 5 SA 179 
(WCC). This remedy applies in addition to the personal (or representative) remedy of a 
shareholder at common law: Communicare v Khan 2013 4 SA 482 (SCA). See also 
Beukes and Swart 2014 PER 49. 
 122 See s 2 for the definition of a related person. In essence a juristic person will be related to 
another juristic person if either controls the other as defined in s 2(2) or either is a subsid-
iary of the other (as defined in s 3) or a person directly or indirectly controls each of them 
or the business of each of them as defined in s 2(2). S 2(2) defines control in respect of 
companies as basically to include majority voting power in the company or on the board 
of that company or if a person is able to materially influence the policy of that company 
in a manner comparable to a person having such majority voting powers. 
 123 [2013] 2 All SA 190 (GNP) para 17.4. 
 124 Henochsberg 574(3) and especially Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goede Hoop Sitrus (Pty) Ltd 
2014 5 SA 179 (WCC) para 54. 
 125 See s 164. See also Beukes “An introduction to the appraisal remedy as proposed in the 
Companies Bill: Triggering actions and the differences between the appraisal remedy and 
existing shareholder remedies” 2008 SA Merc LJ 479 (but see Pike “An alternative view 
of the appraisal remedy” 2015 SA Merc LJ 678–687); Beukes “An introduction to the ap-
praisal remedy in the Companies Act 2008: Standing and the appraisal procedure” 2010 
SA Merc LJ 176 and Yeats “Putting appraisal rights into perspective” 2014 Stell LR 328. 
 126 As regulated in ch 5 of the Act.  
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that the company is no longer able to continue with an otherwise favourable 
transaction.127 
A person may be declared delinquent to act as a director.128 A wide range of 
people may apply to court to declare a director delinquent or place him under 
probation. A shareholder is one of those listed in section 162 that has locus stan-
di to apply to court for an order declaring the director delinquent or place him 
under probation. Instances of delinquency include, inter alia, that while being a 
director one grossly abused his or her position as a director or acted in a manner 
that amounted to gross negligence. A person may also be placed under probation 
on a number of grounds. For example, while being a director he or she acted in a 
manner that is materially inconsistent with the duties of a director.129 By being 
able to declare a director delinquent or place a director under probation share-
holders can ensure that only prudent and appropriate directors serve on the 
board.  
A further new remedy is the remedy given to holders of securities130 to protect 
their (personal) rights. They can apply to court for a declaratory order as to their 
rights as well as an order to rectify any harm done to them.131 The holder of is-
sued securities can therefore apply to court for an order determining his or her 
rights in terms of the Act, the MOI, rules of the company or any applicable debt 
instrument as well as an order to protect any such rights. This remedy is very 
wide and can be used, for example, by a security holder in case of a wrongful re-
fusal of the casting of a vote and also for an order in respect of acts by directors 
that are not in the best interests of the company as required by section 76(3)(b), 
as section 66(1)(b)(ii)(aa) clearly provides that a holder of issued securities of a 
company may apply to a court for any appropriate order necessary to rectify any 
harm done to the securities holder by any of its directors to the extent that they 
are or may be held liable in terms of section 77, thus also for a contravention of 
section 76(3)(b). Liability in terms of section 77 is in respect of fiduciary duties 
to the company, which should be enforced by the statutory derivative action in 
section 165. However, this section seems to include the personal action as a 
cause of action. It will, however, be difficult to indicate that the directors did not 
act in the best interests of the company, for example, by giving preference to the 
rights of employees instead of the rights of shareholders. It also provides a 
shareholder with direct recourse against a director to the extent that the director 
is liable under section 77. This section 77, however, applies in the director’s 
breach of his or her duties which will cause harm to the company and not the in-
dividual shareholder. The link between the shareholders’ loss or damage and that 
of the company is uncertain. It is also not clear how “rights” should be interpret-
ed in terms of this provision. Cassim et al argue that it can be interpreted in a 
wide sense, in that every shareholder has a general right to have the MOI and 
rules being observed by the company. It can also be interpreted more narrowly 
by including the personal rights of the shareholder, but not those provisions of 
the MOI that place duties or obligations on the company.132  
________________________ 
 127 See Esser (2014) 49. 
 128 S 165(5). 
 129 See s 162(5). 
 130 See s 161. 
 131 See s 161 and Contemporary company law 817–820. 
 132 Contemporary company law 819. 
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Section 20 also provides ample rights to shareholders to protect them in the 
context of company actions with third parties. Section 20(1)(a) dealing with the 
validity of company actions is of relevance. In terms of this section the contract 
concluded with the third party will be valid only if the directors had no authority 
to authorise the action, but only as a result of the limitation, restriction or qualifi-
cation on the capacity of the company.133 If there is a lack on the basis of authori-
ty then section 20(1)(a) will not apply and the company is subsequently not 
bound by the contract, based on the common-law principles of agency. Share-
holders, directors, prescribed officers or a trade union representing employees of 
the company may apply to the High Court for an order to restrain the company 
from doing anything inconsistent with the limits, restriction and qualifications. 
This is without any prejudice to the bona fide third party’s rights.134 Delport ar-
gues that it is uncertain how the bona fide party will obtain rights if the action is 
restrained (before the conclusion of the contract, for example).135 Shareholders, 
directors and prescribed officers of a company may also apply to the High Court 
for an order to restrain the company or directors from acting against any limit, 
restriction or qualification in the company’s MOI, subject to the rights of the bo-
na fide third party.136 A shareholder will also have a claim against the directors 
and prescribed officers for damages if they acted intentionally, fraudulently or 
grossly negligent in contravention of the Act or against a limitation, restriction or 
qualification of the company (that is, ultra vires) or their authority, unless rati-
fied by special resolution.137 Acts in contravention of the Act cannot be rati-
fied,138 but those against a limitation, restriction or qualification can be ratified, 
apparently also if the act was fraudulent. This is a deviation from the trite com-
mon-law principle that fraudulent acts cannot be ratified and, in essence, allows 
the shareholders to authorise theft by the directors.139 
The shareholder, and in some instances also the holder of shares, has extensive 
remedies in terms of the Act. Basically the philosophy of the Act is served by 
these remedies, but in some instances it may be said that the basic principles of 
company law may have been affected negatively,140 while others, such as section 
161, may have increased the protection of the shareholder while unfortunately 
transferring the deficiencies of similar remedies in terms of the 1973 Act into the 
2008 Act.141  
________________________ 
 133 See s 20(2). The shareholders may, by special resolution, ratify any action by the compa-
ny or its directors that is inconsistent with any such limit, restriction or qualification. Such 
action may not be inconsistent with the Act, see s 20(3). 
 134 See s 20(4). 
 135 Delport New entrepreneurial law (2014) 99. 
 136 See s 20(5). 
 137 See s 20(6) and discussion supra. 
 138 S 20(3). 
 139 This is a deviation from the common law principle that fraudulent acts cannot be ratified 
and, in essence, allows the shareholders to authorise theft by the directors. See 
Henochsberg 96. 
 140 S 20(6) and see discussion supra. 
 141 Eg, the lack of incentive for the shareholder in the statutory derivative action as well as 
the paucity of inside information to effectively institute or commence the action. See 
Cilliers and Benade Corporate law 306 and authorities there cited in respect of s 266 of 
the 1973 Act which could be seen as the equivalent of s 163 of the 2008 Act. 
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3 4 Directors’ remuneration 
A director is not entitled to remuneration simply because he has been appointed 
as a director. However, a company may remunerate a director for his services, 
unless this is prohibited by the MOI.142 Section 66(9) of the Act provides that 
remuneration may only be paid to directors for their services in accordance with 
a special resolution approved by the shareholders every two years.143 Loubser144 
states that this means that at least the policy or formula of the company to deter-
mine the payment of remuneration to its directors must be approved, in advance, 
every two years by the shareholders. Authorisation by shareholders is thus need-
ed and this suggests some control over the remuneration payable to directors.145 
This is, however, debatable as the question arises as to what remuneration has to 
be approved.146 Luiz argues that in terms of section 66(8) read with section 66(9) 
“remuneration to its directors for their services as directors” has to be approved. 
There is, however, no definition of “remuneration” in the Act. “Remuneration” is 
only defined in section 30(6). This is, however, done in the context of what has 
to be disclosed in the annual financial statements.147 Luiz argues further that it 
seems as if there is a distinction between remuneration paid for services rendered 
as a director to or on behalf of the company and for other remuneration like a 
salary, bonus and performance-related payments in section 30(6).148 She states 
that it can be interpreted that fees paid to directors for services rendered to or on 
behalf of the company mean fees paid to a director for being a director. These 
fees will include, for example, to prepare for a board meeting and to give input at 
such a meeting.149 This could then be viewed as different from amounts received 
________________________ 
 142 S 66(8). 
 143 Remuneration paid to a director for services rendered as a director without approval by 
way of a special resolution will result in a contravention of the 2008 Companies Act. This 
means that it will be possible to institute an action against the directors who authorised or 
made the payment based on a breach of their fiduciary duties. Any person who suffered a 
loss or damage due to this contravention will also be able to rely on s 218(2). See Luiz 
“Executive remuneration and shareholder voting” 2013 SA Merc LJ 292. 
 144 Esser and Havenga 46. 
 145 Luiz 2013 SA Merc LJ 292. 
 146 Idem 293. 
 147 Companies that are required to have their financial statements audited must include par-
ticulars on, inter alia, remuneration. See s 30(4). This includes public companies and cer-
tain other companies. See ss 30(2)(a) and 30(2)(b) and 30(2A). In the non-binding opin-
ion of the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission in terms of s 188(2)(b) of 27 
October 2011, “Interpretation of section 30 (2) and 30 (4) of the Companies Act, 2008, in 
relation to the disclosure of directors’ remuneration in private companies”, the CIPC con-
cluded that companies whose AFS must be audited in terms of the regulations (eg, certain 
private companies), are also excluded from disclosing directors’ remuneration as the audit 
requirement is in terms of the regulations and not in terms of the 2008 Companies Act, 
although the Act clearly provided in s 1 that the word “Act” includes the regulations. This 
opinion was, however, withdrawn with effect from 12 March 2015. See Locke in Esser 
and Havenga 66ff for a discussion of enhanced accountability in terms of the 2008 Com-
panies Act. 
 148 Luiz 2013 SA Merc LJ 293.  
 149 See Contemporary company law 455–456 where this issue is discussed. They state that: 
“It is debatable whether it was the intention of the legislature to require approval by spe-
cial resolution for board meetings only” (456). They state that until the wording of s 66(8) 
is clarified it is advisable to get shareholder approval by way of a special resolution for 
continued on next page 
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as salary, bonuses, etcetera. It is debatable whether this approach should be fol-
lowed, but if “remuneration to its directors for their service as directors” is inter-
preted in a narrow sense, the protection that shareholders have by way of a spe-
cial resolution is limited. This will mean that shareholders will only have input 
into the amounts paid to directors in their capacity as directors and they will not 
have any say in the executive remuneration packages.150 In practice this means 
that only the remuneration of non-executive directors are approved in terms of 
the Act.151 
As stated above, disclosure of the particulars of remuneration of directors in 
the annual financial statements is regulated in the Act and, where applicable, in 
the Listings requirements. King III also has good recommendations on remunera-
tion which are in line with international best practices. However, South Africa 
does not provide shareholders with “a meaningful voice” on executive remunera-
tion based on the narrow interpretation of “remuneration to its directors for their 
service as directors” in section 66(8), as explained before.152 Shareholders can 
vote against the remuneration policy, but they merely have an advisory vote in 
certain instances as discussed above, and would otherwise have to take a special 
resolution in terms of section 66(9). The board of directors does not have to ad-
here to an advisory vote and the passing of a (negative) special resolution is un-
duly cumbersome.153 
King III recommends that companies remunerate directors and executives fair-
ly and responsibly,154 disclose the remuneration of each individual director155 
and that shareholders should approve the remuneration policy of the company.156 
With regard to non-executive directors it is recommended that their fees consist 
of a base-fee as well as an attendance fee per meeting.157 Although permitted by 
the Act it is recommended in King III that the chairman and other non-executive 
directors should not receive share options or other incentives linked to share 
prices.158 King III also recommends the appointment of a remuneration commit-
tee.159 This committee has to assist the board with the drafting of the remunera-
tion policy. Listed companies must also comply with the Listings require-
________________________ 
board fees for attending board meetings etc as well as for executive remuneration packag-
es under employment contracts in order to ensure that you do not contravene the Act. 
 150 Luiz 2013 SA Merc LJ 293. See also Henochsberg 258(6). There is no consistent applica-
tion of this requirement: See the Sanlam Ltd and Steinhoff International Ltd 2014 annual 
financial statements. 
 151 For one exception see Steinhoff International integrated report 2014. 
 152 Luiz 2013 SA Merc LJ 296. 
 153 This is, however, only recommended in King III, recommended practice 2.27.1. See also 
para 8.63(a) of the Listings requirements. Listed companies have to comply with King III 
or explain reasons of non-compliance in the annual report. 
 154  King III principle 2.25. 
155  King III principle 2.26. This must be done in the remuneration report and it will form part 
of the company’s integrated report. Ch 9 of King III deals with integrated reporting and 
disclosure. 
 156  King III principle 2.27. This is by way of a non-binding, ordinary majority advisory vote. 
 157  See 2.25.4. 
 158  See Loubser in Esser and Havenga 44–46 for the recommendations on remuneration as 
per King III. 
 159  King III recommended practice 2.23.6 and 2.25.2. 
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ments160 which require that certain financial information must be disclosed relat-
ing to directors’ remuneration.161 Although King III goes much further than the 
Act in respect of the “say on pay” by the shareholders, the remedies for non-
compliance are limited as it is not law.162 
3 5 Shareholder activism 
From the above discussion it is clear that shareholders have ample rights and 
remedies in terms of the Act, even if somewhat ineffective in certain instances. 
The next question that has to be addressed is the extent to which the law provides 
auxiliary support to shareholders to realise these rights and remedies and to en-
courage them to use it.163  
A number of provisions in the Act encourage shareholder activism. First, there 
are a number of provisions aimed at ensuring that shareholders attend more 
meetings. Section 64(1) provides that the quorum at a shareholders’ meeting is 
25 per cent “of all of the voting rights that are entitled to be exercised in respect 
of at least one matter to be decided at that meeting”. There was no votes quorum 
in the 1973 Companies Act164 and the quorum requirement may result in more 
shareholders attending company meetings as the company will encourage them 
to attend or obtain proxies in order for the meetings to be able to continue. How-
ever, the forced quorum in respect of non-quorate meetings may actually also 
work against shareholder attendance.165 The fact that proxies can be submitted 
electronically will also contribute to reaching a quorum and having greater 
shareholder participation in company meetings.166 A lower or even higher quor-
um percentage may, however, be stipulated in a company’s MOI.167 Meetings 
can be held electronically and shareholders can participate via electronic (inter-
active) communication.168 This will obviously save the shareholders some travel-
ling time and the costs associated with attending in person, which will result in 
overall lower costs for the shareholders.169 Section 60 provides for the informal 
round-robin resolution to the effect that a resolution that could be voted on at a 
shareholders’ meeting may instead be submitted to shareholders, who are entitled 
to vote on the resolution, and voted on in writing by the shareholders with the 
________________________ 
 160  See Listings requirements, s 8. 
 161  See Luiz 2013 SA Merc LJ 294 and especially 295–296 for a summary of the principles of 
remuneration of directors in South Africa. 
 162  See Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 2006 5 SA 
333 (W) and Esser and Delport 449. 
 163 See Esser (2014) for a detailed discussion of shareholder rights and activism and idem 
43–46 for the recommendations in King II and King III on shareholder activism. 
 164 See s 190 of the 1973 Companies Act where the quorum was three members entitled to 
vote in the case of a public company and two members entitled to vote in the case of a 
profit company. 
 165 S 64(8).  
 166 See ss 58 and 6(11). 
 167 See s 64(2). Too high a quorum may frustrate the proper functioning of meetings; as it 
might be difficult to meet the quorum requirement. There is apparently no minimum 
threshold. 
 168 S 64(1).   
 169 See in general on shareholder apathy Contemporary company law 497–501. 
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same majorities applicable as for the formal resolution.170 This must happen 
within 20 business days after the shareholders have received the resolution. 
Secondly, the fact that the Act now specifically provides for voting rights of 
beneficial shareholders will also have an impact on shareholder activism. Section 
56 deals with a beneficial interest in securities. The beneficial shareholder is en-
titled to the rights attached to the share while the registered shareholder is the 
person in whose name the share is registered. A company’s issued securities may 
be held by, and registered in the name of, one person for the beneficial interest of 
another, unless otherwise provided in the MOI.171 A person who holds the bene-
ficial interest in any security may vote in a matter at a meeting of shareholders 
only to the extent that the beneficial interest includes the right to vote on the mat-
ter and the person’s name is on the company’s register of disclosures as the 
holder of a beneficial interest or the person holds a proxy appointment in respect 
of the matter from the registered holder of those securities.172 A major new shift 
in corporate control has, however, been enacted in section 56(9) and (11) that in-
ter alia provides that person who holds a beneficial interest which includes the 
right to vote173 is entitled to vote if the name of that holder is included in the reg-
ister of disclosures or if that person holds a proxy from the registered holder (the 
nominee). The registered holder of any securities in which any (other) person has 
a beneficial interest which must, it is submitted, be at least a voting right, must 
deliver the notice of any meeting of the company, together with a proxy ap-
pointment to the holder of a beneficial interest. The holder of a beneficial interest 
is entitled to demand a proxy appointment by the registered holder and the latter 
is obliged to provide it, to the extent of the beneficial shareholding. The benefi-
cial holder will therefore be the proxy of the registered holder.174 Section 56(9) 
to (11) is not applicable to securities that are subject to the rules of a central se-
curities depository, which would in effect be companies that are listed on the JSE 
Ltd. These provisions ensure that the beneficial shareholder has knowledge of 
any meeting and proposed resolution, and also to actively participate as benefi-
cial owner of the shares, other than merely giving instructions to the nominee 
shareholder as to the manner of voting. 
________________________ 
 170 This is in addition to the common law unanimous consent. The requirements of notice and 
periods of notice are, however, uncertain. This resolution can, apparently, not be used in 
respect of resolution required for ss 71 and 115. 
 171 See s 56(1). 
 172 See Joubert (fn 35 above) 184 fn 6. See, however, Henderson and Van der Linde “Uncer-
tificated shares: A comparative look at the voting rights of shareholders” 2014 TSAR 496 
who argue that the direct relationship between the shareholder and company is diluted due 
to the intermediary (nominee) holdings to the detriment of the shareholder rights. 
 173 A beneficial interest is defined in s 1 as “when used in relation to a company’s securities, 
means the right or entitlement of a person, through ownership, agreement, relationship or 
otherwise, alone or together with another person to – (a) receive or participate in any dis-
tribution in respect of the company’s securities; (b) exercise or cause to be exercised, in 
the ordinary course, any or all of the rights attaching to the company’s securities; or (c) 
dispose or direct the disposition of the company’s securities, or any part of a distribution 
in respect of the securities, but does not include any interest held by a person in a unit 
trust or collective investment scheme in terms of the Collective Investment Schemes Act, 
2002 (Act No. 45 of 2002)”. The disjunctive elements of this definition are unfortunate 
and cause uncertainty. See Henochsberg 220. 
 174 See s 58 in respect of proxy appointments. 
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Lastly, reference should be made to CRISA as it can have a significant impact 
on the role that institutional investors can play in the context of investment deci-
sions and environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. CRISA is a Code 
on responsible investment in South Africa.175 Institutional investors can have a 
significant impact on the quality of governance in the companies that they invest 
in. The aim of the Code is to give guidance on how institutional investors should 
execute investment activities to promote sound corporate governance. CRISA 
applies to institutional investors as well as service providers of institutional in-
vestors like asset and fund managers. The Code operates, similar to the King re-
port, on an “apply or explain” voluntary basis. CRISA recommends five guiding 
principles: 
“Principle 1 – An institutional investor should incorporate sustainability consider-
ations, including environmental, social and governance (ESG), into its investment 
analysis and investment activities as part of the delivery of superior risk-adjusted 
returns to the ultimate beneficiaries. 
Principle 2 – An institutional investor should demonstrate its acceptance of 
ownership responsibilities in its investment arrangements and investment activities. 
Principle 3 – Where appropriate, institutional investors should consider a 
collaborative approach to promote acceptance and implementation of the principles 
of CRISA and other codes and standards applicable to institutional investors. 
Principle 4 – An institutional investor should recognise the circumstances and 
relationships that hold a potential for conflicts of interest and should pro-actively 
manage these when they occur. 
Principle 5 – Institutional investors should be transparent about the content of 
their policies, how the policies are implemented and how CRISA is applied to 
enable stakeholders to make informed assessments.” 
CRISA is not about sacrificing on returns; the argument is rather that by taking 
ESG issues into account, they will save money that will be in the best interests of 
their clients, in the long term. Ramalho states that “it is clear that one of the pre-
vailing themes in CRISA is for institutional investors to look beyond short-term 
profit maximisation to incorporate environmental, social and governance consid-
erations into investment analysis and investment activities and report thereon”.176 
It is also stated in the foreword of the Code that institutional investors, as long-
term investors and fiduciaries, have a responsibility to ensure that they invest in 
such a way that will promote long-term sustainability. Many commentators 
did,177 however, argue that one of the reasons for shareholder apathy is that insti-
tutional investors first have a duty towards their clients and only then to the 
company. Their clients are mostly only interested in profit-maximisation, most 
probably in the short term. The argument held in CRISA is that by taking ESG 
issues into consideration the clients will benefit in any event.  
________________________ 
 175 The Code was drafted by the Stakeholder Committee chaired by John Oliphant. CRISA 
aims to provide the investor community with the guidance needed to give effect to the 
King III report as well as the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI) initiative. CRISA has been endorsed by the Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa (IoDSA), the Principal Officers Association (POA), and the Association 
for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA). The principles of CRISA are 
supported by the Financial Services Board (FSB) and the JSE Ltd (JSE).   
 176 Ansie Ramalho is the former CEO of the IODSA. 
 177 See generally Esser and Havenga “Shareholder participation in corporate governance” 
2008 Speculum Juris 74 and Griggs “Institutional investors and corporate governance” 
1996 James Cook Univ LR 4. 
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During September 2013 The IODSA published a research report on responsi-
ble investment: CRISA disclosure by institutional investors and their service 
providers.178 The research on which the report is based relied on publicly availa-
ble information, disclosed by institutional investors and their service providers, 
to evaluate the progress made towards responsible investment. It is held that a 
growing number of institutional investors and their service providers are inte-
grating responsible investment principles into their investment practices. The 
findings do, however, indicate that disclosed data are not always properly com-
parable, as their format, content and intentions are too dissimilar. There is also a 
lot of diversity as to the quality of the disclosure and the approaches of integrat-
ing ESG factors into investment decision making. The industry is to a large ex-
tent characterised by passive and selective approaches to responsible investment. 
Progress seems limited as it is unclear what it really means to integrate ESG con-
siderations into investment decision making. It must, however, be kept in mind 
that disclosure guidelines were only published at the beginning of 2013.179  
CRISA is obviously important for the shareholders because although there is 
no remedy that can be enforced, it benefits shareholders and protects their inter-
ests as sound governance, and the monitoring thereof, will reduce any risks for 
the shareholder and the need to enforce rights through the application of reme-
dies. On a next level, disclosure to the investor in respect of the voting by the in-
stitutional investor in respect of shares held on behalf of the investor, will not 
enable the investor to have a direct influence on the company, but dissatisfaction 
in the way the institutional investor voted on particular resolution could have the 
effect that the investor “votes with his feet” by withdrawing the investment. This 
will have a direct effect not only on how the institutional investor will exercise 
its voting rights, but also on how the company conducts it business and applies 
sound corporate governance.180 
The legal framework of a specific country will ultimately determine the signif-
icance of shareholder involvement. We are of the view that the South African le-
gal framework provides ample opportunity for shareholders to make a difference. 
Various provisions of the Act were looked at and it was indicated that these pro-
visions can facilitate greater shareholder involvement in company management, 
which will eventually contribute to good corporate governance. Provisions relat-
ing to the conduct of meetings, shareholder remedies and the voting rights of 
beneficial shareholders were specifically considered in this context. 
4 CONCLUSIONS  
The Act has as a mission to protect shareholder rights, to advance shareholder 
activism and to provide enhanced protection for minority shareholders. South 
Africa has a concentration of shareholding, either through institutional invest-
ment or through direct blockholding of shares. However, unfortunately there 
does not seem to be a central theme in the Act that supports the stated mission. 
Section 66(1) now gives original powers to the board of directors to manage the 
________________________ 
 178 The report can be downloaded at http://bit.ly/1Wh516S (accessed on 1May 2015). 
 179 Recent studies show that the vast majority of respondents value ESG issues, with 84% of 
the South African institutional investors in this sample considering them: Van der Ahee 
and Schulschenk “The State of responsible investment in South Africa” Ernst & Young 
(January 2013), available at http://bit.ly/1LXYXWN (accessed on 10 May 2015). 
 180 See also Joubert (fn 35 above) 184 in respect of shareholders “voting with their feet”.  
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business and affairs, that is the life and death, of the company. The inherent 
powers of the shareholders, to the extent that those existed at common law, are 
now abolished; so is the ultimate power to act as the company. This radical 
movement away from the common law seems to be at odds with the mission as 
stated above. In respect of direct control there remains the ultimate power to 
dismiss directors with an ordinary resolution. In company law this is a powerful 
tool, but certain aspects counter its effectiveness. When dismissing an executive 
director the labour laws must also be complied with. This has the effect that the 
swift and final result of the dismissal is excluded. Also, the fact that the dismis-
sal cannot be effected by an informal process, such as in section 60, further di-
minishes its effect. So does the possibility of weighted voting rights of directors, 
as the removal of even all the elected directors could still have the effect that 
control is with the directors that cannot be removed. This is in addition to the en-
trenchment of elected directors due to shareholders’ agreements. Dispersed 
shareholding can work in favour of the remedy, because the apathy of the small 
shareholder, who does not attend meetings, will have the effect that a small mi-
nority may be able to exercise “control” in this sense,181 while block sharehold-
ing would clearly have the opposite effect. 
Other remedies for individual shareholders, like sections 161, 163 and 164, 
would give the shareholder the option either to force the company, directors and 
even related parties to comply with their basic duties, or, under certain circum-
stances, elect to terminate the relationship with the company. Certain inherent 
inefficiencies make for a restricted application of those sections, however, with 
the most important arguably the restriction to shareholders as defined in the Act. 
The positive effect of the Act is that although there is a concerted movement 
towards, at least partially, supporting the inclusive approach with emphasis on 
CSR, the primacy of the shareholder as in the enlightened shareholder approach 
is still firmly recognised. 
The control by shareholders over the remuneration of directors may have an 
effect on compliance with the wishes and directions given by the shareholders. 
However, the dichotomy between the approval of the remuneration and the dis-
closure of that remuneration will lessen the effect of this (indirect) remedy, as 
approval of the remuneration of non-executive directors will have little effect on 
the general management of the company. 
Requirements of King III in respect of non-executive and independent direc-
tors and the nomination of these directors could give some comfort to the share-
holder. However, the nomination process is managed by the company, with little 
or no input from the shareholder. The “forced” sabbatical of a managing director, 
only to return as non-executive chairperson two years later, will perpetuate the 
same management and management principles. 
In total it would appear that the philosophy of shareholder protection as in 
section 7 of the Act was extensively incorporated in the remedies of sharehold-
ers. However, certain provisions seem to militate against the clear philosophy. 
The profile of shareholding in South Africa can still curtail the effective use of 
some of the remedies, as blockholding still seem to be prevalent in South African 
companies. When, in contrast with the position in certain overseas jurisdictions, 
________________________ 
 181  See s 65 of the Act and Henochsberg 247. 
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the board does not have a duty towards minority shareholders per se, the exercise 
of the remedies by those shareholders become ineffective. In a dispersed share-
holding model the apathy of the small shareholder may work in favour of the 
minority shareholders, but only if there is no blockholding. In totality the Act, 
with King III, give extensive rights and remedies, but with King III only, at best 
in the case of unlisted companies, indirectly enforceable, the real total protection 
of especially minority shareholders is not at the levels where it should have been. 
